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pressure, quantity, and volume of water provided, and explored the
possibility of drilling a private well on their lots. Dyegard denied their
request, claiming covenant eighteen barred water well drilling.
Subsequently, Dyegard amended covenant eighteen to expressly
prohibit well drilling for private water sources.
The Hoovers filed suit for declaratory judgment in the District
Court of Parker County, claiming the covenants did not restrict water
well drilling on their lots. Dyegard's response stated the amended
covenants specifically prohibited drilling water wells and further, the
original covenant language prohibited water well drilling. The
Hoovers filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the Hoovers' motion.
Dyegard appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals of
Texas, and contended the trial court erred because the original
covenants expressly prohibited well drilling. Moreover, Dyegard
argued the trial court erred because the amended covenants were
enforceable.
Dyegard argued the covenant clearly prohibited drilling for water,
because water is a mineral. The court of appeals did not agree. The
appellate court pointed to Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., where
that court held the definition of minerals excluded water.
Furthermore, the Texas Property Code defines mineral to mean oil,
gas uranium, sulphur, and other substances, yet, purposely omits
water.
The appellate court also noted that laws pertaining to
groundwater developed entirely separately from oil and gas law.
Covenant eighteen's extensive list of mining prohibitions contributed
to the court's conclusion that the covenant referred to minerals, and
not water. The appellate court concluded the Hoovers could drill
water wells under the original covenants, because water is not a
mineral.
Dyegard maintained the amended covenant clarified any
ambiguity by clearly prohibiting water wells within Oak View Estates.
The Hoovers argued the amended covenants were not valid, because
the original covenants did not authorize Dyegard to make
modifications to the covenants without property owner concurrence.
The appellate court concluded the original covenants clearly reserved
the developer's right to amend the covenants, thus finding Dyegard's
amendment valid as a matter of law.
The appellate court affirmed summary judgment that the original
covenants allowed the Hoovers to drill water wells, reversed summary
judgment regarding the amended covenants' validity, and remanded
for further proceedings.
Holly Kirsner
Hess v. McLean Feedyard, Inc., No. 07-99-0519-CV, 2000 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8114 (Tex. App. Nov. 28, 2000) (affirming no-evidence
summary judgment motion on basis that landowners failed to produce
expert evidence on the cause of alleged water contamination).
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Jake Hess, II and neighboring landowners (collectively,
"Landowners") sued McLean Feedyard, Inc., ("McLean") for allegedly
contaminating their surface and groundwater when lagoons holding
cattle sewage overflowed during a period of heavy rains. In response,
McLean filed a no-evidence summary judgment motion asserting the
landowners had not provided evidence of causation. The trial court
granted McLean's motion and denied the landowners any relief. The
landowners appealed, contending genuine issues of material fact
precluding summary judgment were raised as to causation, and the
trial court abused its discretion when it excluded affidavits as summary
judgment evidence. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed that the
trial court did not err in striking the affidavit of the landowner's expert
and in granting McLean's no-evidence summary judgment motion.
McLean operated a commercial cattle feedyard, located in the
Little Skillet Creek watershed, with a capacity of 25,000 cattle and a
series of lagoons to collect and hold cattle waste. The discharge gates
of McLean's lagoons were located approximately one mile upstream
from the nearest landowner, Hess, who also held 4,000 cattle in his
preconditioning operations.
On three occasions in April 1997,
McLean's lagoons overflowed after repeated heavy rains. McLean
properly reported the discharges to authorities.
The Landowners claimed the discharges from the lagoons
contaminated their surface water and groundwater supplies, making
them unsuitable for consumption by humans and livestock. McLean
did not deny the discharges contained manure, but contended the
water volume passing through Little Skillet Creek diluted the waste so
that downstream landowners were not harmed.
However, the
Landowners submitted with their summary judgment motion, the
affidavit of their expert witness as proof that the lagoon discharges did
damage their water supplies.
Under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the proponent of an expert
opinion submitted by affidavit in a summary judgment proceeding has
the burden to show the expert opinion met the requirements of Texas
Rules of Evidence. Furthermore, the trial judge is the gatekeeper who
determines the admissibility of expert evidence and the appellate
court only reviews whether a trial judge abused his discretion.
In considering the Landowners' expert witness affidavit, the court
determined the expert opinion constituted bare conclusions and did
not provide supporting facts. The most damaging aspect of the
expert's submission, according to the court, was the complete lack of
data regarding water quality before the April 1997 lagoon overflows.
Thus, the court found the expert based his opinion on conjecture or
speculation regarding the water quality before the heavy rains. Thus,
the opinion did not constitute causation evidence. Furthermore, in
response to McLean's no-evidence summary judgment motion, the
burden fell on the Landowners to present evidence that raised a
genuine fact issue. A no-evidence summary judgment is improperly
granted if the non-movant presented more than a scintilla of probative
evidence. The Landowners contended the affidavit of their expert
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presented the necessary causation evidence, but the trial court
disagreed. Therefore, the reviewing court concluded the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in striking the affidavit and the trial court
properly granted the no-evidence summary judgment motion.
John A. Heifrich
VIRGINIA
Carrv. Kidd, 540 S.E.2d 884 (Va. 2001) (holding an historic mean
water line that is unaltered by man is the appropriate measurement in
the apportionment of riparian rights, and a riparian owner will gain
the right to water frontage unless the grantor of the interest in such
riparian property clearly retains such right for himself or another on
the face of the granting deed).
Plaintiffs, Robert C. and Marjorie B. Kidd, and defendants, the
Mark S. and Lori Crowley, owned adjoining land fronting a cove
located on Tanner's Creek in Norfolk, Virginia. Upon the Crowleys'
objection to the Kidds' desire to construct a pier into the cove, the
Kidds hired Robert L. Taliaferro, a riparian surveyor, to determine
each of the parties' riparian rights. Taliaferro determined the Kidds'
proposed pier was within their riparian rights and the Crowleys
existing pier was encroaching on the Kidds' rights. The Kidds sued
the Crowleys requesting a determination of each of the parties' rights
and claiming trespass.
In response, the Crowleys hired their own surveyor, Robert M.
Kennedy, whose survey results were nearly identical to those of
Taliaferro. The parties reached a tentative settlement that would have
required the Crowleys to remove their current pier and allow
construction of new piers by both parties within their determined
rights.
Upon learning of the pending settlement, Leslie G. Carr and
Janice N. Kohl (collectively, the "Carrs"), neighbors of the Crowleys,
intervened claiming the Kennedy survey incorrectly drew rights across
the Carrs' property.
The trial court referred the matter to a commissioner in chancery
who recommended allocation of riparian rights pursuant to the
Kennedy survey. The commissioner noted in his report that a historic
mean water line, or one unaltered by man-made improvements, is the
appropriate measurement to determine riparian rights. The trial
court affirmed the commissioner's report and entered judgment
accordingly.
On appeal, the Carrs first claimed the commissioner's acceptance
of the Kennedy survey was inappropriate because the survey used an
incorrect mean low water line measurement in determining each of
the parties' riparian rights. Second, the Carrs claimed the source deed

